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1.   Introduction 
 
The rational addiction model proposed by Becker and Murphy (1988) has become a standard 
approach in the analysis of addictive goods. A number of papers have empirically investigated the 
model by using data on different harmful drugs, like cigarettes (Chaloupka, 1991; Becker et al., 
1994), alcohol (Grossman et al., 1995; Waters and Sloan, 1995; Bentzen et al., 1999), caffeine 
(Olekalns and Bardsley, 1996), opium (Van Ours, 1995; Liu et al., 1999), cocaine (Grossman and 
Chaloupka, 1998).  
As already stated in Becker and Murphy (1988), people can be addicted to most every product 
or activity independently of a biological or pharmaceutical dependency. Hence, the model has been 
tested with gambling (Mobilia, 1993), calorie consumption (Cawley, 1999; Levy, 2002), news 
(Dewenter, 2002), and arts (Villani, 1992). A further good that is suitable for empirical tests of the 
rational addiction model is cinema. A number of studies deal with this topic (Fernández Blanco and 
Banos Pino, 1997; Cameron, 1999; Macmillan and Smith, 2001; Dewenter and Westermann, 2002), 
but all these studies only focus on cinema attendance within a single country.  
In this paper we extend the analysis of the demand for cinema to thirteen European countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) by using pooled cross-section and time-series data over the 
period 1989-2002. There are at least two good reasons for thinking that there are gains from an 
empirical dynamic study of state-disaggregated cinema markets. First, it is likely that geography 
matters for the cinema consumption of a country, such as to justify studying state-disaggregated 
models. Secondly, applying dynamic panel data models may control for all time-invariant variables 
or state-invariant variables, whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-section or 
time-series study. 
The proceeding of this paper is the following. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
the rational addiction model. Section 3 describes the data set to be used. The econometric 
specification is shown in Section 4. Section 5 summarises the empirical findings. Section 6 
concludes.   4
 
2.   Theoretical Background 
 
A consumer is said to be addicted to a consumption good if an increase in past consumption 
leads to an increase in present consumption ceteris paribus (Becker et al., 1994). This behaviour is 
usually assumed to involve reinforcement and tolerance (Bask and Melkersson, 2001). 
Reinforcement means that an increase in past level of consumption  increases the craving for 
present consumption. On the other hand, tolerance means that the satisfaction from a given level of 
consumption is lower when past level is greater. However, some consumers, described as being 
'myopic', may have such a high rate of preference for present consumption (and discount the future 
so heavily) that the impact of tolerance effects on current consumption are negligible, and positive 
reinforcement effects of previous consumption on the marginal utility of current consumption can 
cause the demand for a habit-forming good to soar to persistently high levels. 
Following Becker et. al. (1994), utility of an individual at time t depends on the consumption 
of two goods,  a non-addictive good, xt, and an addictive good, ct, and on the impact of a set of 
unmeasured life-cycle variables, et. A simple way to distinguish the consumption of two goods is to 
assume that current utility for the addictive good also depends on a measure of past consumption of 
c. To this aim, Becker et al. (1994) introduced the habit stock,  1 − = t t c S , as a measure of the degree 
of addiction at time t. 
Assuming a constant rate of time preference, σ , and a infinity lifetime the concave and time- 
separable utility function (in ct,xt and ct-1), would be 
 
(1)   [] dt e c c x u e U t t t t
t , , , 1 0 −
∞ − ∫ =
σ .  
 
Utility is negatively affected by ct-1 in the case of harmful products; by contrast, in the case of 
harmless product, previous consumption can also have a positive effect on individual health, such as 
the case of cinema consumption.  
Consumer consumption’s choices are constrained by the consumer’s wealth, W,  and the 
prices of c and x at time t, respectively pct and pxt. Assuming pxt as a numeraire, the consumer faces 
the following budget constraint. 
 
(2)  W x c p r t t ct
t = + + ∑
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where pct the price of the addictive good and W is the consumer’s wealth. As consumer is 
forward looking, also discounted stream of future prices puts a constraints on the consumer’s 
consumption choices. Maximizing equation (1) under this life-time budget constraint, one can 
obtain the optimal path of consumption for c and x. A standard technique used in literature to derive 
a structural demand function for consumption of c is to approximate the instantaneous utility 
function in the neighborhood of steady-state by a quadratic function in the arguments. Assuming a 
rate of time preferences equals to the market interest rate, i.e., σ  = r, the demand equation for c can 
be derived as 
 
(3)





δ  ,   
 
where the θ ’s are parameters which depend on the underlying preferences.
2 Equation (3) nests 
different behaviors. Since a good is addictive if and only if an increase in past consumption leads to 
an increase in current consumption, a zero value of θ 1 implies a non-addicted consumer. Only when 
θ 1 > 0, forces that increase past or future consumption, such as lower past or future prices of 
addictive goods, lead to an increase in current consumption, throughout an intertemporal 
substituting process, and past, present and future consumption are complements. Testing for rational 
addiction is testing for forward looking behavior. An addicted but myopic consumer is not 
farsighted, according to a simply backward looking consumer decision, while a rational addicted 
consumer takes into account consequences of past, current and future information. The rational 
model implies that the coefficient on future consumption should have the same sign as the 
coefficient on lagged consumption (the sign differ only by the term δ ). Only if θ 2 > 0, a change in 
future events lead to an increase of current consumption.  
Another advantage of this specification is that using the characteristic roots of the second-
order difference equation in (3), λ 1 and λ 2
3
, one can derive the short- and long-run relationship 
between consumption and prices in form of elasticities, respectively  s η  e  l η , computed, at sample 
means, as (Dewenter, 2002): 
                                                           
1 From the rational addiction model a parameter restriction is imposed on eq. (2), i.e.  1 2 δ θ θ =  .
1 Testing this parameter restriction - 
the null hypothesis of reasonable values of δ  implied by the estimated parameters - has been used in the literature as a ‘test’ of the 
validity of the rational addiction model (Cameron, 1998). 
2 An alternative to the rational addiction model – known as ‘habit persistence’ - allows for the effect of past consumption on current 
consumption, but ignores the effects of future addictive behaviour on current consumption (McGuiness and Cowling, 1975; Fujii, 
1980; Baltagi and Levin, 1986). 
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= . As they are conditions for a maximum, they measure the response 
of current consumption on variation in future or past consumption respectively. As long the utility function is concave in ct and ct-1, 



























where c and  p are the sample means, respectively of c and pct.   7
   
3.   Data 
 
This section provides a brief description of the data sets used in this paper. The data consists 
of aggregate national annual time series from 1989 to 2001 for thirteen European countries.
4 In 
particular, the theoretical framework is investigated using the following variables: 
 
(i)  Cinema consumption:  cinema consumption, adm, is measured as the average cinema 
attendance per inhabitant per year. This variable is the quotient of the annual attendance in a year 
divided by the total population. The data are from European Cinema Yearbook, published by 
Mediasalles. 
 
(ii) Price: the price of cinema consumption, pri, is measured as the deflated average annual ticket 
price at box-office.
5 This variable is built  as the ratio between the annual total receipts in a year and 
the number of tickets sold. The data are supplied by the above mentionated publication European 
Cinema Yearbook. 
 
(iii)  Other Determinants: this vector comprises additional factors that may exert some influence on 
cinema consumption. In particular, an increase in per capita income, inc, displays an ambiguous 
impact on cinema demand. In fact, cinema demand is expected to rise with income increase; but, at 
the same time, an increase in income level leads to a growth of opportunity costs. The per capita 
GDP has been deflated by CPI index. The data are from Annual Statistics, published by World 
Bank.  
Furthermore, the quality of product supplied seems to be an important determinant of 
admissions. To this aim, the number of screen per km squared, scr, is introduced in the final 
specification of the model. In fact, during nineties the introduction of multiplex has improved the 
quality of cinema viewing throughout the use of a superior audiovisual technology. The data are 
from European Cinema Yearbook, published by Mediasalles. 
Finally, as pointed out in Fernández Blanco and Prieto Rodriguez (2003), competition in 
movie industry is another important determinant to explain cinema demand. Both production and 
distribution side of European cinema market are controlled by Hollywood majors. Nevertheless, in 
some countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK, there is space for the co-existence 
                                                           
4 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. 
5 Due to the lack of data, we do not take account of a second component of price, basically, expenses for transport, as in Fernández-
Blanco and Baños Pino (1997).   8
of a strong domestic movie industry, making an effective competition throughout the creation of a 
national star system or by specializing in those movie fields that American majors are less 
interested in, such as author’s picture, or reflective films. The national domestic movie production, 
mov, is measured as the number of domestic movies per year as reported in the European Cinema 
Yearbook, published by Mediasalles. 
 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1]   9
 
4.   Empirical Specification 
 
According to the theoretical model and the variables suggested in the previous sections, the 
empirical specification of the demand function for cinema is: 
(6)  , , , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i mov scr inc pri adm adm adm ε α α α α α α α + + + + + + + = + −   
 
where subscript i and t stand respectively for the country and the period considered and  t i, ε  is the 
error term. 
The direct estimation of equation (6) may give rise to some misleading results and some 
caution is necessary. First step in the analysis is to test the hypothesis that data can be pooled. 
Following Levaggi and Zanola (2003), F-tests are performed on the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for each variable in equation (6) are the same for each year. Results are reported in 
table 2. The null hypothesis of equal coefficients could not be rejected in either case, therefore we 




Next step is to test the stationarity of the variables included in the model. In order to 
determine the presence of panel unit root we employ the IPS t-bar tests (Breitung, 2000). The panel 
tests include a heterogeneous time trend in their specifications. Table 3 shows that the null of unit 
root could not be rejected and hence the series are I(1) processes. When testing the series in first 




Therefore, equation (6) is estimated in first differences, such that: 
 
(7)    t i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i mov scr inc pri adm adm adm , , 6 , 5 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 , 1 0 , ε α α α α α α α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ + −
  
where ∆  is the first difference operator.   10
 
5.   Results 
 
Taking first differences will induce a first-order moving average process into the trasformed 
residuals, and since we have potentially endogenous variables on the right hand side, we must rely 
on instrumental variable techniques to get consistent estimates
6. Since the estimator that uses 
differences as instruments suffers from singularities as well as large variances (Arellano, 1989), we 
instrumented endogenous variables with lagged and led levels of each variables in (6). Due to over-
identification, we adopt the generalized method of moments (GMM) which is proved to be an 
appropriate method to have a consistent estimator when the number of instruments is higher than 
exogenous variables, as is the case here (Hamilton, 1995). Instruments validity is checked using the 
difference in difference Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions
7 (Sargan, 1958; Hensen, 1982). 




The estimation results provide a strong evidence that cinema consumption conforms to a 
rational addiction hypothesis. Both the coefficient on past and future consumption are positive and 
significantly different from zero, so that past and future changes significantly impact present 
consumption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis of myopic behaviour. We also notice 
that θ 1 > θ 2 as expected. This finding supports the hypothesis that a high rate of time preferences 
increases the effect of past consumption on a consumer’s present consumption (reinforcement), but 
reduces the effects of future consumption on current consumption (tolerance). 
The other coefficients estimated are statistically significant at all common level and carry the 
right “sign”. In particular, the coefficient on price is negative and significantly different from zero. 
The coefficient on income variable, inc, shows a positive and significant impact on consumption. 
However, the model specification estimated don’t allow us to compute the long-run relationship 
between disposable income and current consumption, so that nothing could be told about the nature 
of luxury good of cinema. The coefficient of screen variable, scr, exhibits a positive and significant 
impact on present admission, leading to the conclusion that the change in distribution during 
nineties, with the introduction of multiplex, has effectively contributed to interrupted and partially 
                                                           
6 Differencing produces the disturbance term ui,t - ui,t-1 -ρ ( ui,t-1- ui,t-2) which displays second-order serial correlation. Given this type 
of serial correlation, yi,t-2 is not valid as an instrument since it will be correlated with ui,t-2 in the differenced disturbance term. 
7  The statistic is the difference between the Sargan statistic computed using  the instruments tested in the set of exogenous 
instruments (restricted model) and the Sargan statistic computed excluding the variable checked from the set of instruments 
(unrestricted model). The results, together with a complete list of instruments are reported in Appendix.   11
reversed the negative trend in demand. Finally, also the estimates on movie production variable, 
mov, shows a positive impact on cinema demand. 
The estimates of table 4 have been used to compute the two characteristic roots of equation 
(7) and the relative short-run and long-run response to a permanent price change. Short-run 
elasticity, measured in terms of sample means, is –0.55; while the long-run price elasticity is -2.12, 
a value that exceeds the short-run elasticity approximately four times. This result is consistent with 
Becker and Murphy’s rational addiction theory. In fact, long-run effect of permanent price change 
exceeds the short-run response if and only if  2 λ  > 1, which is equivalent to having θ 1 > 0 (Becker et 
al., 1994).   12
 
6.   Conclusion 
 
The objective of this paper was to assess whether cinema consumption may be defined as a 
rational addicted behaviour. We depart from previous studies on cinema consumption as we focus 
on a state-disaggregated model by applying dynamic panel data analysis to control for all time-
invariant variables or state-invariant variables, whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical 
cross-section or time-series study. To this aim, a sample of cross-sectional and time series 
observations covering thirteen European countries over the period 1989-2002 has been used. The 
generalised method of moments estimates strongly suggest that cinema consumption conforms to a 
rational addiction hypothesis. Furthermore, other variables included in the regression have resulted 
significant in explaining the demand for cinema. The present result confirms previous researches 
extending evidence of the rational addicted behaviour to European countries. 
To sum up, this paper provides empirical support to rational addiction model in that cinema 
consumption depends on past and future consumption. The future extension of this study will 
explore the rational addicted behavior to include two goods, cinema and television. 
   13
References 
 
-  ANDERSON, T. W. and HSIAO, C. (1981), “Estimation in Dynamic Models with Error 
Components”, Journal of The American Statistical Association, 76, 598-606. 
 
-  ARELLANO, M. and BOND, S. (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence and an application to Employment Equations”, Review of Economic Studies, 
58, 277-297. 
 
-  AULD, C. and GROOTENDORST, P. (2001), “An empirical analysis of milk addiction”, 
University of Calgary, Department of Economics, Working Paper 2001-17. 
 
-  BAC, M. (2001), “Corruption, connections and transparency: Does a better screen imply a 
better scene?”, Public Choice, 107, 87-96. 
 
-  BASK, M., MELKERSSON, M. (2001), “Rationally Addicted to Drinking and Smoking?”, 
Umea University, mimeo. 
 
-  BECKER, G. S., GROSSMAN, M., MURPHY, K. M. (1994), “An Epirical Analysis of 
Cigarette Addiction”, American Economic Review, 84(3), 396-418. 
 
-  BECKER, G. S., MURPHY, K. M. (1988), “A Theory of Rational Addction”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 96(4), 675-700. 
 
-  BENTZEN, J, ERIKSSON, T., SMITH, V. (1999), “Rational Addiction and Alcohol 
Consumption: Evidence from the Nordic Countries”, Journal of Consumer Policy, 22(3), 257-279. 
 
-  BLOMSQVIST, A. G. and CARTER, R.A.L. (1997), “Is Health Care really a luxury?”. 
Journal of Health Economics, 16, 207-229. 
 
-  CAMERON, S. (1999), “Rational Addiction and the Demand for Cinema”, Applied 
Economic Letters,  6(9), 617-620. 
 
-  CAWLEY, J.H. (1999), “Rational Addiction, the Consumption of Calories, and Body 
Weight”, PhD Thesis, University of Chicago.   14
-  CHALOUPKA, F. (1991), “Rational Addictive Behaviour and Cigarette Smoking”, Journal 
of Political Economy, 99(4), 722-742.  
 
-  DEWENTER, R. (2002), “Rational Addiction to News?”, Habit Formation and Print Media 
Usage, mimeo. 
 
-  DEWENTER, R. and WESTERMANN, M. (2002), “Cinema Demand in Germany”, 
University of Essen, mimeo. 
 
-  FERNÁNDEZ BLANCO, V. and BAÑOS PINO, J. (1997), “Cinema Demand in Spain: A 
Cointegration Analysis”, Journal of Cultural Economics, 21, 57-75. 
 
-  FERNÁNDEZ-BLANCO, V. and PRIETO RODRÍGUEZ, J. (2003), “Building Strong 
National Movie Industries: the Case of Spain”, The Journal of Art Management, Law and Society, 
33, 142-155. 
 
-  GROSSMAN, M., CHALOUPKA, F.J. (1998), “The Demand for Cocaine by Young 
Adults: A Rational Addiction Approach”,  Journal of Health Economics, 17(4), 427-474. 
 
-  GROSSMAN, M., CHALOUPKA, F.J., SIRTALAN, I. (1995), “An Empirical Analysis of 
Alcohol Addiction: Result from the Monitoring the Future Panels”,  NBER, WP 5200. 
 
-  IM, K. S., PESARAN, M. H. and SHIN Y. (1997), “Testing for Unit Roots in 
Heterogeneous Panel”, Working paper, University of Cambridge. 
 
-  JOHANSEN, S. and JUSELIUS, K. (1990), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation and 
Inferences on Cointegration with Applications to the Demand for Money”,  Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 52, 169-210. 
 
-  LEVAGGI, R. and ZANOLA, R. (2003), “Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from 
Regional Health Expenditure in Italy”,  International Tax and Public Finance, 10, 535-547. 
 
-  LEVY, A. (2002), “A Theory of Rational Junk-Food Consumption”, University of 
Wollongong, mimeo. 
   15
-  LIU, J. L., HAMMIT, J. T., CHOU, S. Y. (1999), “The Price Elasticity of Opium in Taiwan, 
1914-1942”, Journal of Health Economics, 18(6), 795-810. 
 
-  MACMILLAN, P., SMITH, I. (2001), “Explaining Post-War Cinema Attendance in Great 
Britain”, Journal of Cultural Economics, 25, 91-108. 
 
-  MOBILIA, P. (1993), “Gambling as a Rational Addiction”, Journal of Gambling Studies, 
9(2), 121-151. 
 
-  OLEKALNS, N., BARDSLEY, P. (1996), “Rational Addiction to Caffeine: An Analysis of 
Coffee Consumption” Journal of Political Economy, 104(5), 1100-1104. 
 
-  PEDRONI, P. (1999), “Critical values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with 
Multiple Regressors”, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61, 653-670. 
 
-  VAN OURS, J. C. (1995), “The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of opium in the 
Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938”, Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), 261-279. 
 
-  VILLANI, A. (1992), “Rational Addiction in the Arts”, Ricerche Economiche, 46, 41-54. 
 
-  WATERS, T. M., SLOAN, F. A. (1995), “Why do People Drink? Tests of the Rational 
Addiction Model”, Applied Economics, 27, 727-736.  
   16
Table 1.   Definition of the variable used in the study 
 
 
Variable   Mean  Std.Dev.  MIN  MAX 
adm 1.9569  0.5700 0.8912  3.48 
pri 6.0405 0.8954  4.0618  8.7556 
inc 24433.82  5535.534  12125.05  39600 
scr 7.6496 4.5504  0.9497  17.2691 
mov 48.0439 46.5208  0  204 
   17






DYprii,t  0.54 
DYinci,t  0.19 
DYscri,t  0.14 




Notes: For testing the hypothesis of pooling the following augmented models have been 
estimated: 
 
admi,t = β 0  +  β 1prii,t + Σβ 1iDprii,t + β 2inci,t + Σβ 2iDinci,t + β 3scri,t + Σβ 3iDscri,t + β 4movi,t + 
Σβ 4iDmovi,t + ε i,t,  
 
by adding T-1 year dummy for each variable that take the value 1 if observation belongs to the 
year considered. The F test is performed on the coefficient of these variables.   18
Table 3.   Im-Pesaran-Shin test for unit roots 
 
 
Variable t-bar  p-value Trend 
adm -2.307  0.307  Yes 
pri -1.838  0.887 Yes 
inc -2.287  0.333 Yes 
scr -1.738  0.942 Yes 
mov -1.897  0.839  Yes 
∆ adm -4.309 0.000  Yes 
∆ pri -3.265 0.000  Yes 
∆ inc -2.377 0.095  Yes 
∆ scr -2.083 0.019  Yes 
∆ mov -3.612  0.000  Yes 
 
Notes: The Im-Pesaran-Shin test involves the null hypothesis that each series has a unit roots against the 
alternative hypothesis that the series have different persistence. The null hypothesis is tested using the average of 
the t-ratios for each time series. ∆  is the first difference operator.   19


































Notes: Instruments used are 3 lagged and 2 led levels of both explanatory variables and dependent 
variable. Regression includes T-1 time and N-1 country dummy variables but their estimates are non 
reported  to save space. Arellano and Bond (1991) residual tests are performed on the null hypothesis 
of zero auto-covariance in residual (of order 1
A e 2
B). 
 */**/*** indicates significance at 0.01/0.05/0.10, respectively. 
 
Variables  Estimated coefficient  Standard Error 
adm(t-1) 0,5505*  0,1770 
adm(t+1) 0,3483**  0,1441 
pri -0,0695* 0,0245 
inc 0,0000653***  0,0000363 
scr 0,1094* 0,0418 
mov 0,0052*  0,0011 
R
2  0,5513  
Sargan test  22,473   
Arellano and Bond residual test  p-value 
AR(1)
A  -2,37 0,0180 
AR(2)
B  0,98 0,3289 
λ1  0,4698   
λ2  1,3466   
η s  -0,545789   
η l  -2,120481     20
Appendix.   Instruments validity 
 
 
Instruments C-stat  P-value 
adm(t-3) 0.222  0.63749 
adm (t-4)  1.587  0.20782 
adm (t-5)  0.356  0.55092 
adm (t+3)  2.474  0.11572 
adm (t+4)  1.568  0.21049 
pri(t-3) 3.054  0.08055 
pri(t-4) 0.206  0.64964 
pri(t-5) 0.672  0.41242 
pri(t+3) 1.101  0.29394 
pri(t+4) 1.164  0.28065 
inc(t-3) 1.576  0.20934 
inc(t-4) 0.312  0.57632 
inc(t-5) 0.098  0.75402 
inc(t+3) 0.131  0.71714 
inc(t+4) 0.635  0.42566 
scr(t-3) 0.911  0.33982 
scr(t-4) 1.327  0.24932 
scr(t-5) 0.174  0.67662 
scr(t+3) 0.159  0.68964 
scr(t+4) 0.636  0.42534 
mov(t-3) 1.275  0.25890 
mov(t-4) 0.164  0.68551 
mov(t-5) 0.467  0.49420 
mov(t+3) 4.621  0.03159 
mov(t+4) 0.833  0.36142 
 
Notes: The C test involves the null hypothesis of exogeneity of each 
instruments tested. The statistic is computed as the difference between the 
Sargan statistic computed using  the instruments tested in the set of exogenous 
instruments (restricted model) and the Sargan statistic computed excluding the 
variable checked from the set of instruments (unrestricted model). Under the 
null of exogeneity of instrument, C-statistic has a chi-sq. distribution with  
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